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Clear Inarticulation—State Action Antitrust
Immunity and State Agencies:
Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn
Screening Program
I. INTRODUCTION
In Parker v. Brown,1 the Supreme Court held that states are immune from federal antitrust law for their actions as sovereigns. This
has come to be known as the Parker Doctrine or the state action
doctrine. In Parker, a raisin distributor, Porter Brown, challenged a
1940 California regulation that raised prices and restricted the supply
of California raisins. The Court found that the Sherman Act contained neither a hint nor a suggestion of any intention “to restrain
state action or official action directed by a state.”2 Therefore, California’s regulation of the raisin industry was immune from federal
antitrust scrutiny. Because of this desire to defer to state sovereignty,
states were found to be immune from federal antitrust actions.
Predictably, applying the state action doctrine can be confusing.
As one court noted, “[O]f late, the state action doctrine has become
a road well-traveled by the Court. Its signposts, however, remain less
than clear.”3 Unfortunately, the well-traveled road of the state action
doctrine splits off into meandering paths that are not so welltraveled. The path of state action antitrust immunity for actions
taken by state agencies is one of the more difficult paths to follow,
and the signposts that do exist are often confusing. As state reliance
on state agency decision making becomes more prevalent, establishing clear guidelines for applying state action immunity to state agencies becomes increasingly important.
The rules and requirements governing state action immunity are
different according to the category in which an actor is placed. The
Supreme Court has established three categories that are used to de-

1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
2. Id. at 351.
3. First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass’n, 714 F.2d 1439, 1450 (8th
Cir. 1983).
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termine how state action immunity should be applied. The first category includes acts of the state acting as sovereign. The actions of the
state legislature and state supreme court fit into this category4 and
are considered ipso facto immune from antitrust laws.5 The second
category includes acts taken by political subdivisions. The acts of
municipalities have been placed in this category.6 Their actions are
immune from antitrust liability only where a clearly articulated state
policy authorizes their actions.7 The final category includes acts taken
by private actors pursuant to state regulations.8 Private actors are
immune under the state action doctrine only when they act pursuant
to a clearly articulated state policy and the state actively supervises
the anticompetitive conduct.9
The Supreme Court has not clearly explained how to categorize
actions taken by a state agency. Consequently, lower courts—
particularly the United States Courts of Appeals—have attempted to
decide the issue without guidance and, not surprisingly, have arrived
at different conclusions. In Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England
Newborn Screening Program,10 the First Circuit held that the actions
of state executive agencies should be viewed as the actions of the
state acting as a sovereign, thereby treating state agencies like state
legislatures and state supreme courts and rendering state agencies
immune from antitrust liability.11 In contrast, the Sixth and Second
Circuits have applied the clear articulation requirement to state
agency action, determining that the actions of state agencies should
be placed in the same category as actions taken by municipalities or
political subdivisions.12
This Note will argue that the First Circuit correctly determined
state agencies’ actions to be the actions of the state acting as a sover4. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977).
5. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567–68.
6. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978).
7. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985).
8. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
57 (1985).
9. See id.; California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 104 (1980).
10. 187 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999).
11. See id. at 28–29.
12. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984); Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1998).
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eign and that the actions of state agencies should not be subject to
the clear articulation requirement. The clear articulation requirement
should not be used because it burdens state agencies by making
regulation more difficult, costly, and time consuming. Under the
clear articulation requirement, when deciding whether antitrust immunity can be granted to state agencies, courts must search for a
statutory provision plainly showing that “the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.”13 Resolving the question of
how to categorize state agencies is important because state agencies
and private actors acting pursuant to state regulations need to be
able to determine beforehand whether their actions are likely to be
granted immunity and what burdens they will be subjected to before
immunity can be granted.
Part II of this Note outlines the background and development of
the law regarding state action antitrust immunity. In addition, Part
II summarizes the debate between the circuits about whether a clear
articulation of a legislative intent for an agency to restrain competition is required before state action immunity can be applied to the
state agency. Part III gives the facts of Neo Gen and discusses the
analysis used by the First Circuit in holding that the actions of state
executive agencies should receive immunity from antitrust suits.
Next, Part IV appraises the value of the First Circuit’s reasoning in
Neo Gen in light of other attempts to reconcile where state agencies
belong in the antitrust state action doctrine. Part IV suggests that
the logic and analysis employed by the First Circuit are appropriate
for determining when the actions of state agencies are entitled to
immunity from antitrust actions. Part V concludes that the actions of
state agencies should be deemed actions of the state itself and should
not be subject to the same clear articulation requirement that applies
to municipalities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. State Action Antitrust Immunity: History, Purpose, and Function
The Supreme Court has developed three categories within the
Parker Doctrine to determine whether the state is acting as sovereign
13. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978)
(quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.
1976)).
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and what type of extra safeguards need to be added when the actor is
not the state itself. Therefore, the first step in state action immunity
analysis is to determine within which category the actor should be
placed.
1. State legislatures and state supreme courts
The first category of actors includes state legislatures and state
supreme courts. The Supreme Court ruled in Hoover v. Ronwin 14
that actors in this category “ipso facto are exempt from the operation
of the antitrust laws.”15 The Court further explained that state legislatures are entitled to this immunity because of the language in
Parker:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual
system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states
are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract
from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s
control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.16

State supreme courts were extended the same immunity as state
legislatures in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.17 In reviewing this issue,
the Hoover Court explained the Bates ruling by stating that “a state
supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity, occupies the
same position as that of a state legislature. Therefore, a decision of a
state supreme court, acting legislatively rather than judicially, is exempt from Sherman Act liability as state action.”18
The Bates case focused on the authority of the state supreme
court to regulate the practice of law. The Supreme Court explained
in Bates that the key question was whether the anticompetitive restraint was compelled by the State acting as sovereign.19 Because the
state supreme court was the ultimate body wielding the State’s
power over the practice of law, the state supreme court was acting in
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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466 U.S. 558 (1984).
Id. at 567–68.
Id. at 567 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943)).
433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977).
Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 360).
See Bates, 433 U.S. at 360.
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a legislative capacity, representing the State acting as sovereign, when
it regulated the practice of law.20 Based on the reasoning in Hoover
and Bates, the actions of state legislatures and supreme courts (when
acting legislatively) are immune from antitrust liability because the
Sherman Act does not apply to the actions of a state acting as sovereign.
2. Municipalities and political subdivisions
In the second category, political subdivisions, such as municipalities, are immune from antitrust liability only where their anticompetitive acts flow from a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.”21 Closer analysis of municipality action is
required than for state legislature or supreme court action because
political subdivisions are not themselves sovereign.22 Because Parker’s
exemption limitations were aimed at official action directed by a
state, the Court required state subdivisions to be able to trace their
actions back to the state itself in order to prove they were compelled
by the state acting as sovereign.23 The Supreme Court was unwilling
to presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive municipal action from federal antitrust laws.24 The Court thus refused to
extend ipso facto immunity to municipalities because of a fear that
economic dislocation could result if cities were free to place their
own interests above the nation’s economic goals as reflected in the
antitrust laws.25
3. Private actors
The third category encompasses private actors. Private actors can
benefit from state action antitrust immunity only if they act pursuant
to a clearly articulated state policy and if the state actively supervises
the anticompetitive conduct.26 The Supreme Court extended immu20. See id.
21. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985).
22. See id. at 38 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 412 (1978)).
23. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412–13.
24. See id. at 413.
25. See id.
26. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
57 (1985); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104
(1980).
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nity for private action because otherwise the congressional purpose
outlined in Parker would be frustrated, “for a State would be unable
to implement programs that restrain competition among private parties.”27 The Court added the active supervision requirement to prevent “the State from frustrating the national policy in favor of competition by casting a ‘gauzy cloak of state involvement’ over what is
essentially private anticompetitive conduct.”28 The active supervision
requirement “ensures that a State’s actions will immunize the anticompetitive conduct of private parties only when the ‘state has demonstrated its commitment to a program through its exercise of regulatory oversight.’”29
B. Antitrust Immunity for State Agencies: Development of the Law
The Supreme Court has never determined whether state agencies
should be placed in the same antitrust category as state legislatures
and supreme courts or in the municipality category. Circuit courts
proceeded to address the issue without Supreme Court guidance,
leading to a split among the circuits regarding how to treat state
agency actions. Some circuits have declined to apply the clear articulation test, finding that the actions of the state agency should be
placed within the same category as actions taken by the state legislature or state supreme court. Other circuits have placed state agencies
within the political subdivision category, requiring the clear articulation test to be performed before state action immunity can be
granted.
1. Circuits holding the clear articulation requirement inapplicable to
state agencies
Three circuits have held that the clear articulation test should not
apply to state agencies in determining antitrust liability. The First
Circuit, for example, has held that the clear articulation test should
not be applied to actions taken by state agencies. In Neo Gen, the
court stated, “[W]e have rejected a ‘clear articulation’ test as applied
to the state’s executive branch, at least where a full-fledged depart-

27. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56.
28. Id. at 57 (citing Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106).
29. Id. at 62 n.23 (citing 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 213a (1978)).
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ment is concerned.”30 The court reasoned that, according to the
Parker Doctrine, Congress did not seek to regulate the states themselves and “‘the states’ include their executive branches quite as
much as their legislatures and their courts.”31
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc.32 that “state executives and executive agencies, like the state supreme court, are entitled to Parker
immunity for actions taken pursuant to their constitutional authority,
regardless of whether these particular actions or their anticompetitive
effects were contemplated by the legislature.”33 The Ninth Circuit
justified its decision to withhold the clear articulation requirement
from state agencies, thereby placing the agencies in a different category than municipalities, by explaining that “cities are treated differently from branches of the state governments for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment.”34
The Ninth Circuit also noted in Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transportation 35 that Hoover v. Ronwin 36 had left open
“the circumstances under which the activities of a state executive
branch are entitled to antitrust immunity.”37 The Ninth Circuit held
that the Department of Transportation was entitled to immunity because it was fulfilling its state constitutional duty by acting as the
governor’s subordinate and this action constituted the state acting as
sovereign.38 The court explained that the clear articulation requirement did not apply because of the difference between this case and
the situation in Lafayette. The court indicated that Lafayette “involved a government delegation of authority to private parties” but
“this is not a case of private parties imposing competitive restraints in
conjunction with state authorities.”39

30. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d
24, 29 (1st Cir. 1999).
31. Id.
32. 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987).
33. Id. at 876.
34. Id. at 876 n.6.
35. 745 F.2d 1281 (1984).
36. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
37. Deak-Perera, 745 F.2d at 1282 (citing Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568).
38. See id.
39. Id. at 1283.
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The Fifth Circuit also refused to apply the clear articulation test
when it held that a state agency was not liable for alleged antitrust
violations. In Saenz v. University Interscholastic League,40 the plaintiff
argued that the University Interscholastic League (“UIL”) violated
antitrust law by rejecting his slide rule product for use in an interscholastic competition.41 The UIL escaped liability because the court
held that the agency was “a governmental entity outside the ambit of
the Sherman Act,”42 thus placing the agency in the same category as
state legislatures and supreme courts.
These three circuits have refused to apply the clear articulation
requirement to state agencies, although not for particularly clear reasons. The First and Ninth Circuits each stated that executive agencies deserved ipso facto immunity because they were part of the executive branch. The Fifth Circuit, however, simply stated that state
agencies are outside of the clear articulation requirement without
making any distinction regarding executive agencies.
None of the circuits appears to have addressed whether different
types of state agencies should be treated differently based on whether
they are defined as an executive agency. Although state agencies may
be classified as executive, legislative, or perhaps independent, it is not
clear whether the circuit court had these distinctions in mind and
meant to exclude any type of state agency from ipso facto immunity.
It is not clear what might distinguish state agencies from one another for antitrust purposes. At the federal level, executive agencies
are generally defined as “[a]gencies whose heads are subject to
unlimited presidential removal authority.”43 Independent agencies
are those “headed by persons who the President cannot remove at
will.”44 It is unclear whether the First and Ninth Circuits intended to
only grant ipso facto immunity to agencies that are a part of the executive department but not those that are independent or attached
to the state legislature. It is possible that these courts defined executive agencies as agencies that exercise executive power. Under this
type of definition, most agencies would qualify for immunity because
agencies “typically wield powers that are characteristic of each of the

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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Id. at 8.
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three principle branches of government,” including “executive power
to investigate potential violations of rules or statutes and to prosecute offenders.”45
Because it is unclear what type of executive ties the First and
Ninth Circuits had in mind when granting immunity to “executive
agencies,” ipso facto immunity should not be denied to agencies that
do not fit the federal definition of an executive agency based solely
on the circuit courts’ choice of words. Based on the arguments given
in Part IV, state agencies should be placed within the same category
as state supreme courts and legislatures for antitrust immunity purposes.
2. Circuits holding the clear articulation requirement applicable to
state agencies
So far, two circuits have adopted the rule making the clear articulation requirement applicable to state agency action. The Second
Circuit held in Cine 42nd Street Theater Corp. v. Nederlander Org.,
Inc.46 that “[w]hen a state agency, municipality, or other state subdivision claims a state immunity from federal law, it must first identify
a ‘clearly expressed state policy’ that authorizes its actions.”47 However, the Second Circuit later appeared to backtrack from this position in Automated Salvage Transport, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Environmental Systems, Inc.,48 where the court found that certain types of
state agencies should be treated “as the State itself rather than as a
municipality.”49 The court left the question of how to treat state
agency action open, however, because it decided the case on other
grounds and ruled that the clear articulation requirement had been
met.50 Because Cine 42nd Street Theater has not been overruled, it
appears that the Second Circuit requires the application of the clear
articulation test to state agency action. However, the dicta in Automated Salvage Transport raises the possibility that the requirement
may be overruled in the future and state agencies may be treated the
same as the state legislature or supreme court.
45. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN
(4th ed. 1997).
46. 790 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1986).
47. Id. at 1043 (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985)).
48. 155 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1998).
49. Id. at 70.
50. See id. at 71–72.

A NUTSHELL 9
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The Sixth Circuit expressed confusion about whether to apply
the clear articulation requirement to the actions of the Ohio Water
Development Agency (“OWDA”) in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City
of Akron.51 The court noted that there was a good argument that an
agency with statewide powers “should not be required to show that
its conduct was ‘pursuant to an affirmatively expressed and clearly articulated policy’ to displace competition.”52 The court ended up applying the clear articulation requirement because the parties never
argued whether or not OWDA should have been viewed as the state
acting as sovereign.53
III. NEO GEN SCREENING, INC. V. NEW ENGLAND NEWBORN
SCREENING PROGRAM
A. The Facts
Neo Gen Screening, Inc. (“Neo Gen”), a private Pennsylvania
corporation, brought a federal antitrust action against the University
of Massachusetts, the University’s Screening Program (the New
England Newborn Screening Program), and officials of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. Neo Gen charged the Screening Program and University, in concert with the Department of Public Health, with “monopolizing, attempting to monopolize and/or
conspiring to monopolize ‘newborn screening services’ in Massachusetts.”54
The Screening Program, which consisted of a collection of personnel and a laboratory supervised by the medical school of the University of Massachusetts,55 operated under a contract between the
University and the Department of Public Health to provide screening of newborn infants for specified disorders.56 In 1997, Neo Gen
began trying to persuade hospitals in Massachusetts to use Neo Gen
for screening newborns, claiming that it offered better screening at

51. 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984).
52. Id. at 957.
53. See id.
54. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d
24, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1999).
55. See id. at 26.
56. See id. at 25.
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half the cost charged by the Screening Program.57 According to the
complaint, the University of Massachusetts and its Screening Program then influenced the Department of Public Health to create
emergency regulations requiring screening services in Massachusetts
to be done exclusively by the Screening Program.58
The district court dismissed the action on the ground that it was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the University of Massachusetts and the Screening Program were arms of the state.59 Because Neo Gen failed to effectively dispute the district court’s holding that the Eleventh Amendment covered the University and its
Screening Program, the First Circuit held the dismissal against those
defendants was conceded by Neo Gen.60
Neo Gen argued on appeal that the state officials in the Department of Public Health were intended defendants and that injunctive
relief was sought against them.61 Neo Gen further argued that the
Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief against the state
officials in the Department of Public Health if they violated the
Sherman Act.62 The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, finding that even if the complaint was liberally construed
to include the state officials, Neo Gen was not entitled to relief because the action of the Department of Public Health fell within actions protected by the state action antitrust immunity doctrine.63
B. The Court’s Reasoning
In finding that the actions of the state officials were entitled to
protection under the state action immunity doctrine, the First Circuit examined the motivations behind the Parker Doctrine.64 The
First Circuit then looked at cases that outlined the different categories within the Parker Doctrine.65 After examining how other circuits

57. See id. at 26.
58. See id.
59. See id. Because of an apparent pleading error, the district court found that no relief
was being sought against the state officers. See id. at 27.
60. See id. at 26–27.
61. See id. at 27.
62. See id. at 27–28.
63. See id. at 29–30.
64. See id. at 28.
65. See id. The cases the court looked at in deciding which category they were dealing
with included: City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Hoo-
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had addressed the issue of how to categorize state agencies for state
action purposes, the First Circuit determined that executive branch
state agencies fit into the same category as state legislatures and
courts.66 Therefore, no clear articulation analysis was required.
1. Parker Doctrine purposes
In analyzing the motivations behind the Parker Doctrine, the
court explained that it was well settled that “a state is free to regulate, or act on its own behalf, in ways that are anti-competitive and
would not be permitted to a private individual.”67 The court acknowledged that the arrangement with the University and the Department of Health was an effective monopoly of screening services
but held that “a regulation or purchase of services made by the state
is classic state action immunized from the Sherman Act.”68 Because
the action taken by the state officials fit within the purposes of the
Parker Doctrine, the court then examined whether such action was
actually taken by the state or some lesser subdivision of the state that
required further analysis before Parker Doctrine immunity could be
applied.69
2. Subcategories within the Parker Doctrine
Neo Gen argued that the actions of the Department of Public
Health should be subject to the clear articulation requirement as
outlined in two Supreme Court cases,70 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co.71 and City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.72 In Lafayette, cities that owned and operated electric utility
systems brought an antitrust action against a competing privatelyowned utility, Louisiana Power & Light, which then brought an antitrust counterclaim against the cities. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the counterclaim should not have
ver v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389 (1978).
66. See Neo Gen, 187 F.3d at 29.
67. Id. at 28 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943); 1 PHILLIP
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 221–22 (1997)).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 28–29.
70. See id.
71. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
72. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
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been dismissed because a municipality is not ipso facto immune from
anticompetitive action but must be able to show that “the state legislature contemplated a certain type of anticompetitive restraint.”73
The Court explained that the clear articulation requirement did not
make it “necessary to point to an express statutory mandate for each
act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will suffice if the
challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent.”74 The
clear articulation requirement created by Lafayette established that
where a subordinate state governmental body was involved a court
must examine the specific facts of the case to determine whether
anticompetitive actions were comprehended within the powers
granted to it by the state legislature.75
Neo Gen also relied on Omni to support its argument that the
clear articulation requirement should be applied to the Department
of Public Health’s actions.76 In this case, Omni brought an antitrust
action against the city for adopting ordinances restricting new billboard construction that left Omni’s competitor, Columbia Outdoor
Advertising, in control of more than ninety-five percent of the billboard market.77 The Court held that the clear articulation requirement applied to the city’s actions and found that the requirement
was met. The Court explained that a statute met the clear articulation requirement as long as the “suppression of competition [was]
the ‘foreseeable result’ of what the statute authorizes.”78
The First Circuit rejected Neo Gen’s use of the Lafayette and
Omni cases to argue that the clear articulation requirement should
apply to the actions of the Department of Public Health, explaining
that the clear articulation requirement in Lafayette and Omni was
applied only to municipalities, not to the state itself.79 The court
then held that the actions of an executive branch agency should be
viewed as the actions of the state, fitting within the same category as
actions taken by the state legislature or state supreme court.80

73. 435 U.S. at 393.
74. Id. at 393–94 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d
431, 434–35 (5th Cir. 1976)).
75. See id. at 394.
76. See Neo Gen, 187 F.3d at 28.
77. See 499 U.S. at 365.
78. Id. at 373 (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985)).
79. See Neo Gen, 187 F.3d at 28 (citing Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984)).
80. See id. at 28–29.

1663

8KEP-FIN.DOC

12/9/00 1:42 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2000

The court justified its holding by explaining that the Supreme
Court “has held that acts of the state legislature or state supreme
court are protected under Parker, but it reserved decision as to
whether state-level executive branch departments or agencies are entitled to similar treatment.”81 Looking at how other circuits had
dealt with the issue of which category to fit state agencies into, the
court determined that only two other circuits had “squarely faced
the issue.”82 The court explained that those two circuits, the Ninth
Circuit in Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii,
Inc.83 and the Fifth Circuit in Saenz v. University Interscholastic
League,84 “extended Parker’s ordinary protection to actions of the
state executive branch.”85
Based on the holdings of these courts and its own analysis, the
First Circuit determined that the clear articulation requirement
should not be applied to the actions of the Department of Health.
The Department of Health’s contract with the University’s Screening Program was entitled to immunity from the antitrust allegations
just as a state legislature or supreme court would be.
IV. ANALYSIS
The controversy about whether state agencies should be granted
the same level of antitrust immunity given to state legislatures and
state supreme courts stems from two competing views of agencies.
On the one side, agencies are viewed as legitimate policy makers because they are made up of independent experts who are best able to
understand complex fact patterns and make the best regulatory decisions for a specialized area.86 On the other side, agencies are seen as
illegitimate speakers for the state because they are not politically re81. Id. at 28 (citing Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568 n.17). The cited footnote reads: “This
case does not present the issue whether the Governor of a State stands in the same position as
the state legislature and supreme court for purposes of the state-action doctrine.” Hoover, 466
U.S. at 568 n.17.
82. Id. at 28.
83. 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987).
84. 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973).
85. Neo Gen, 187 F.3d at 28–29 (citing Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA
of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 875–76 (9th Cir. 1987); Deak-Perera Haw., Inc. v. Dep’t of
Transp., 745 F.2d 1281, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 1984); Saenz v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 487
F.2d 1026, 1027–28 (5th Cir. 1973)).
86. See Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE L.J. 1395, 1397 (1975).

1664

8KEP-FIN.DOC

1651]

12/9/00 1:42 PM

Neo Gen Screening, Inc.

sponsive like a legislature and are susceptible to the corrupting influence of regulated industries.87 Those who fear industry capture worry
that state agencies are too susceptible to losing control of the regulation process to the industries they supposedly regulate.88
Although the Supreme Court has not discussed why agencies
should or should not be held to the clear articulation requirement,
examining those points actually addressed by the Court and the different arguments given by commentators for and against applying
the clear articulation requirement helps to establish why the clear articulation requirement should not be applied to state agency action.
A. The Supreme Court Has Not Required Application of the Clear
Articulation Test to State Agencies
An antitrust case dealing specifically with the actions of a state
agency has not yet come before the Supreme Court. The Court’s
discussion in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.89 is the
closest the Court has come to deciding the state agency issue. Examining the Court’s reasoning and language in Lafayette, along with
other courts’ efforts to interpret this case, demonstrates that the clear
articulation requirement should not be imposed on state agencies.
1. Lafayette does not require that the clear articulation requirement
be applied to state agencies
In Lafayette, the Court established the clear articulation rule, explaining that “cities and other subordinate governmental units” are
only immune from antitrust liability where “the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.”90 The Court required
closer analysis of political subdivision actions than state legislatures
or state supreme courts because political subdivisions were not seen
as sovereign actors. An example of how political subdivisions are not
considered sovereign actors is the fact that the Eleventh Amendment
does not provide political subdivisions with immunity from suit in
federal court.91 The Court placed the burden of identifying a clear
87. See id. at 1397–99.
88. See infra Part IV.B.1.
89. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
90. Id. at 415 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d
431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
91. See id. at 412.
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articulation in qualifying for antitrust immunity on municipal actors
“[i]n light of the serious economic dislocation which could result if
cities were free to place their own parochial interests above the Nation’s economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws.”92
Confusion exists about how this holding applies to state agencies
because the Court was examining a municipality’s actions rather than
those of a state agency. Moreover, it remains unclear whether the
Court meant to include state agencies in the “subordinate governmental unit” category.
The Sixth Circuit noted that the difficulty in interpreting the Lafayette decision and how it relates to state agencies stems from the
fact that the plurality and dissenting opinions in Lafayette are both
supported by four justices.93 In Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of
Akron,94 the Sixth Circuit attempted to interpret Lafayette’s application to state agencies. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the plurality’s
fear of economic dislocation within a state motivated the clear articulation requirement and suggested that a different standard might apply to agencies with state-wide jurisdiction.95 The Hybud court reasoned that this economic dislocation theory might have meant that
an agency with state-wide powers “should not be required to show
that its conduct was ‘pursuant to an affirmatively expressed and
clearly articulated policy’ to displace competition.”96 In the end, the
Sixth Circuit avoided the issue and applied the clear articulation requirement to actions taken by the Ohio Water Development Agency
92. Id. at 412–13.
93. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949, 955 n.5 (6th Cir. 1984)
(quoting Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1195 (6th Cir. 1981)).
94. 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984).
95. See id. at 956.
96. Id. at 957. The court used the following logic from Phillip Areeda to justify its position:
Although the Lafayette requirement of state authorization clearly applies to cities
and other subordinate local units, its application to state agencies is uncertain. On
the one hand, the majority’s belief that ‘authorization’ helps ensure that governmental activity is truly state action could logically be extended to state executive departments and administrative agencies. On the other hand, Justice Brennan’s reasoning was predicated on the existence of a large number of municipalities and other
subordinate governmental units, each pursuing parochial and perhaps conflicting
policies. Their ordinances are locally formulated, with a possible anticompetitive impact beyond city or district limits. . . . State agencies, by contrast, formulate statewide rules and policies.
Id. at 956–57 n.8 (quoting Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for “State Action” After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435, 444 (1981)).
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because the parties never argued that the agency’s actions could be
directly attributed to the state acting as sovereign.97
Regardless of any difficulties courts have experienced in
interpreting Lafayette, the Lafayette Court explicitly noted that the
clear articulation requirement has been applied to one type of state
agency. The Court explained in Lafayette that Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar 98 “made it clear that, for purposes of the Parker doctrine,
not every act of a state agency is that of the State as sovereign.”99 In
Goldfarb, the state bar, “though acting within its broad powers, had
‘voluntarily joined in what [was] essentially a private anticompetitive
activity’ and was not executing the mandate of the State.”100
The problem with this “clear” holding on state agencies is that
state bars are rather unique state agencies, and it is difficult to apply
this holding to actions of other state agencies. Both state legislation
creating state bar associations and case law involving bar associations
generally identify the state bar as a “state administrative agency.”101
However, the bar is also identified as an arm of the state supreme
court, and its power is strictly limited to actions given actual approval
by the state supreme court.102 Because state supreme courts retain
inherent power over the regulation of the legal practice, the clear articulation requirement is already established for state bars in a way
not required for other state agencies. If a state bar were to take any
action not clearly approved by the state supreme court, it would
definitely not be entitled to antitrust immunity because the statute or
rule creating the state bar generally requires state supreme court approval.
In contrast, state agencies do not require the explicit approval of
the governmental branch above them in order to act. They possess
much greater independent decisionmaking power than state bar associations. Because of the differences between state bar associations
97. See Hybud, 742 F.2d. at 957.
98. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
99. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
100. Id. (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792).
101. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 725 (West Supp. 2000); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
81.011(a) (West 1998); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 767 P.2d 1020, 1025 (1989), rev’d, 496
U.S. 1 (1990).
102. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6064, 6077, 6078, 6100 (West 1990); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.011(c) (West 1998); Brotsky v. State Bar of Cal., 368 P.2d 697 (Cal.
1962); Saleeby v. State Bar of Cal., 702 P.2d 525, 557 (Cal. 1985); FLORIDA BAR RULE 14.2(a) (West 1994).
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and other state agencies, the Supreme Court’s statements about state
bars as administrative agencies should not be applied to all state
agencies.
2. Court interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment support placing
state agencies within a different category than municipalities
Because state agencies are treated differently than municipalities
for Eleventh Amendment purposes, they should also be treated differently for antitrust liability purposes. One of the reasons the Lafayette Court gives for holding cities to a different standard than state
legislatures is that cities are not themselves sovereign and do not receive the same federal deference.103 For example, the Eleventh
Amendment precludes a suit against a state in federal court but fails
to provide that same immunity to cities.104 While this reasoning justifies holding cities to a different standard than states, it does not support imposing the clear articulation requirement on state agencies.
Unlike cities, state agencies can receive Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits in federal court where the agency is deemed to be an
arm of the state.105
The Second Circuit used the Eleventh Amendment to propose
that the clear articulation standard should not apply to state agencies
in Automated Salvage Transport, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Environmental
Systems, Inc.106 The court explained that if the state agency’s lines of
oversight were clear and substantial enough for the entity to be
deemed an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes then
the agency’s actions should also be viewed as that of the state itself
rather than a political subdivision such as a municipality for antitrust
purposes.107 The court noted that there were compelling reasons for
concluding that the state agency “should be treated as the State itself
rather than as a municipality.”108 However, the court ended up applying the clear articulation requirement to the agency’s actions
anyway because it found that the requirement had been met.109

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412.
See Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Seattle, 271 U.S. 426 (1926).
See Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1971).
155 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1998).
See id. at 70.
Id.
See id. at 71–72.
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In Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii,
Inc.,110 the Ninth Circuit used the Eleventh Amendment to justify its
holding that state agencies could be found immune from antitrust
liability “regardless of whether these particular actions or their anticompetitive effects were contemplated by the legislature.”111 The
court justified treating state agencies differently than cities for antitrust purposes because “cities are treated differently from branches of
the state governments for purposes of the [E]leventh [A]mendment . . . but state agencies and departments are protected in some
circumstances from suit in federal court by the [E]leventh [A]mendment’s bar against ‘one of the United States.’”112
3. State agencies should be treated differently than municipalities for
antitrust liability purposes
Based on what has actually been said (or not said) by the Supreme Court concerning antitrust immunity for actions taken by
state agencies, it appears that there is still room for interpretation.
There does not appear to be a definite statement one way or the
other about whether state agencies should be held to the clear articulation standard or given ipso facto immunity. When the state action
antitrust immunity categories are compared with the same group of
actors in Eleventh Amendment cases, it becomes evident that state
agencies should be treated differently than municipalities and the
clear articulation requirement should not be applied.
B. Commentator Discussions Support the View That the Clear
Articulation Requirement Should Not Be Applied to State Agencies
In order to determine the reasonableness of the First Circuit’s
holding in Neo Gen, the next step in the analysis is to examine what
commentators have said about applying the clear articulation requirement to state agencies. Even though the Supreme Court has
not specifically addressed whether the clear articulation requirement
should apply to state agencies, some scholars have been fairly vocal
about the reasons the clear articulation requirement should or should
110.
111.
112.
440 U.S.
(1984)).

810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 876.
Id. at 876 n.6 (citing Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
391, 401 (1979); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
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not apply to state agencies. Some writers argue that the clear articulation requirement is necessary to overcome the threat of industries
taking control of the regulation process.113 Other authors have argued against this position, explaining either that industry capture is
not a legitimate problem or that there is not a big enough difference
between the susceptibility of state legislatures and state agencies to
justify the more onerous requirement for agencies.114
Because industry capture does not appear to be a legitimate
threat to agency decision making, the threat of industry capture is
not a justifiable reason for imposing the clear articulation requirement. The advantages that state agencies give to government decision making and their legitimacy as state actors justify placing state
agencies within the same category as state legislatures and state supreme courts and granting ipso facto immunity.
1. Commentators in favor of the clear articulation requirement are
worried about industry capture of state agency policies
William H. Page, of the Mississippi College School of Law, is
one of the strongest supporters of applying the clear articulation requirement to state agency action. He justifies the different antitrust
immunity requirements for state legislatures and state agencies by
explaining that
[l]egislation presumptively embodies the sovereign choice of the
state and is therefore worthy of deference. The policies adopted by
an administrative body, by contrast, do not necessarily reflect the
same reconciliation of interests as in the Madisonian model, and
must therefore fall if not specifically authorized by the enabling legislation.115

Page thus reasons that the extra clear articulation requirement is justified because state agencies are staffed by bureaucrats who are not
politically responsible to the electorate like legislators are.
Additionally, Page argues that the basis of the Parker Doctrine is
that states can depart from the competitive model only when the

113. See infra Part IV.B.1.
114. See infra Part IV.B.2.
115. William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction
and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099,
1126 (1981).
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citizens elect to do so.116 Because state agencies are capable of departing from the competitive model without authorization from a
referendum by the people, the clear articulation requirement is seen
as ensuring that the people are in favor of such a policy. The clear articulation requirement, he argues, is a necessary burden upon state
agencies because it “reinforces representative political processes by
ensuring that the decision to displace antitrust is made only after
competing interest groups have survived the traditional Madisonian
gauntlet of legislative procedures.”117
Because state agency decisions sidestep the “traditional Madisonian gauntlet,” Page argues that agency decision making lacks the balancing of interests that would occur in a democratic legislature.118
This nature of agency decision making makes it “easier for ‘factional
interests that have acquired a supportive public bureaucracy to rule
without submitting their interests to the effective scrutiny and modification of other interests.’”119 Because regulated industries are the
most interested and organized group, Page argues that they are able
to wield disproportionate weight and “capture” agency policy making.120
Legislators are less likely to have their decisions captured by factional interests because they “have a far larger number of decision
makers; this fact by itself makes them more costly to influence [than
administrative agencies].”121 Because state agency policy is more
likely to be captured, according to Page, the clear articulation requirement is necessary to ensure that decisions that depart from the
competitive model are authorized only when the people choose to
do so through their elected state representatives.
However, in developing his argument that the Parker Doctrine
was based on political accountability, Page does not address the issue
of why state supreme courts are given ipso facto immunity regardless
of whether the justices are subject to election. If judges who are not
popularly elected are not subjected to a clear articulation require-

116. See id. at 1106.
117. William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown
in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 619 (1987).
118. See Page, supra note 115, at 1112.
119. Id. (quoting James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, in PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 16, 28 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 1979)).
120. See id.
121. Page, supra note 117, at 634.
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ment, then it would seem unfair to argue that state agencies should
have the clear articulation requirement imposed upon them merely
because agency officers are not popularly elected.
2. The clear articulation requirement is unnecessary for state agencies
Various authors have argued that state agencies should not be
subject to the clear articulation requirement for different reasons.
Some argue that state legislators are just as subject to capture as state
agencies and that capture is not enough of a legitimate threat to justify the added burden. Others explain that the clear articulation requirement would lead to wasted resources and inefficiency. They
agree, however, that the clear articulation requirement is unnecessary
for state agencies.
a. Legislators are just as subject to capture as state agencies. In an
article responding to Page, one critic argues that legislators are actually even more subject to capture than are state agency officials. The
author explains that “a straightforward way for an industry to capture the benefits of anticompetitive state policy is to pay state policymakers for the favor, as part of a great American tradition called
campaign contributions. Yet contributing to state bureaucrats is typically a felony.”122 This critic also disputes Page’s theory that the
greater number of decision makers in legislatures make agencies easier to capture. Since legislatures usually internally delegate a great
degree of authority, “it is not clear that, on any given issue, committee members or informed and influential legislators in fact do outnumber the board members of a typical agency.”123
Page’s answer to these arguments is that the number theory
alone is not the only factor that makes legislators less subject to capture. Page explains that bicameralism and the executive veto also
serve to establish controls on factions.124 However, historical examples raise serious questions about whether legislatures are really any
more immune to capture than agencies. One author explains that
there have been “several instances in recent years of relatively independent and farsighted agency action blocked by a Congress acting

122. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (1988).
123. Id. at 1332.
124. See Page, supra note 117, at 631.
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in the service of special interests.”125 Examples of these instances include congressional use of the budget to control Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Petroleum Commission enforcement activities in a way favorable to industries. The ability of the
cigarette lobby to convince Congress to prevent the Federal Trade
Commission from requiring proper disclosure of the hazards of cigarette smoking is another example of a legislative body bending to industry pressure more than the agency involved.126 Another author
argues that since the safeguards of public hearings and judicial review
that apply to administrative agencies do not apply to Congress or its
subcommittees the legislature should not be viewed as being less
subject to capture than regulatory agencies.127 These arguments,
taken together, suggest that there does not appear to be enough difference between legislatures’ and agencies’ susceptibility to capture
to justify the extra burden of a clear articulation requirement for
agency action before immunity can be applied.
Agencies are not any more susceptible to capture by industry interests than legislatures. In fact, history appears to suggest that industries have chosen to capture legislative behavior in order to influence agency decision making rather than working directly with the
agencies. Campaign contributions and lobbying efforts appear to be
more effective means of industry capture than risking felony indictments for attempting to sway state bureaucrats. Therefore, the fear
of possible industry capture of industry decision making does not
justify subjecting agencies to the clear articulation requirement.
b. Capture is not a real danger to agency decision making. Not
only is there no real difference between agencies and legislatures
when it comes to capture, a legitimate argument can be made that
capture is not even a legitimate problem. Capture theory is “still
popular with pseudosophisticates, but the more instructed . . . see it
as grossly exaggerating the germ of truth which it does indeed embody.”128 This germ of truth indicates that the interests of regulated
industries do play a significant role in the power complex of agency
125. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and
Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1306 (1972).
126. See id. at 1306–07 & n.63 (1972) (citing WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES ch. 2 (1967)).
127. See Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 351 (1990).
128. Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183,
1187–88 (1973).

1673

8KEP-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/9/00 1:42 PM

[2000

decision making but that capture theory focuses too much on the
industries while excluding other components such as expertise,
stability, and a rationalized exercise of power.129
Other important components that tend to cancel out the capture
theory include agency interaction with the governor and the legislature.130 Procedural requirements such as public hearings and judicial
review also help to provide the political safeguards that Page argues
are lacking.131 A logistical analysis of state agency decisions about
utility rate structures revealed that regulatory resources, ideology,
and legislative party control all had greater influences on state regulation than any pressure by interest groups.132 Because industry capture
of agency decisions does not appear to be a legitimate threat, it cannot be used to justify the clear articulation requirement.
c. Applying the clear articulation requirement to state agencies
leads to wasted resources and inefficiency. The clear articulation requirement is not only unjustified, it also appears to place an undue
burden on state administration. Agencies perform a valuable function
in today’s society in being able to focus their policymaking efforts in
specialized areas where agency officials have developed expertise.
One policymaking advantage that agencies hold over legislatures is
that legislators lack expertise and must tend a broader field than any
single person can master.133 Legislators are often incapable of setting
out detailed specifications in their delegations of power because
delegation requires “intensive and continuous investigation, decision, and revision of specialized and complex issues.”134 These tasks
require resources that legislators are usually unable or unwilling to
muster.135

129. See id. at 1188.
130. See GLENN ABNEY & THOMAS P. LAUTH, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND CITY
ADMINISTRATION 100 (1986).
131. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1679–81 (1975).
132. See Paul Teske, Interests and Institutions in State Regulation, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI.
139, 139 (1991).
133. See Ira Sharkansky, State Administrators in the Political Process, in POLITICS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 238, 251 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines
eds., 2d ed. 1971).
134. Stewart, supra note 131, at 1695.
135. See id.

1674

8KEP-FIN.DOC

12/9/00 1:42 PM

1651]

Neo Gen Screening, Inc.

State reliance on agency decision making in this century has been
“vastly common and commonly vast.”136 State governments need
agencies in order to efficiently carry out regulating duties. Applying
the clear articulation requirement is costly because it is likely to discourage delegation, which permits greater governmental efficiency.
The clear statement doctrine penalizes delegation because it “incurs
costs by making the process of state government more difficult and
time consuming.”137 If state governments are forced to be more specific in delegating power to agencies, then they will be forced to stop
delegating such power and will develop rules and regulations without the specific expertise agency officers are able to employ. As more
time is devoted to detailed regulation previously taken care of by
agencies, state governments will be unable, and sometimes unwilling,
to take the time to deal with difficult issues.
Imposing the clear articulation rule on state agencies will also
lead to inefficiency because state agencies will have to spend more
time seeking approval from state legislatures rather than making decisions. Moreover, enforcing the clear articulation rule will lead to
efficiency problems in the judicial branch. Enforcement of the clear
articulation rule “will prompt state agents to waste resources obtaining authorization, will imperil agents’ actions that lack such authorization, . . . and will involve federal courts in state law issues.”138 Using the rule set out in Neo Gen would overcome these costs and
inefficiencies and allow continued delegation to state agencies where
state officers could put their expertise to use.
V. CONCLUSION
The First Circuit in Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England
Newborn Screening Program 139 correctly held that state agency action
can be viewed as action taken by the state itself and is therefore entitled to state action antitrust immunity without applying the same
clear articulation requirement used for examining actions taken by
municipalities. Applying the clear articulation requirement to state
agencies would likely mean that state legislators would be forced to

136. Wiley, supra note 122, at 1331.
137. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 733–34 (1986).
138. Id. at 738–39.
139. 187 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999).
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spend more time regulating specialized areas better suited to experts.
The nebulous threat of industry capture of state agency decisions
does not justify this damaging loss in efficiency.
The Supreme Court has not “clearly articulated” what type of
analysis should be applied to state agencies in order to grant state action antitrust immunity. The First Circuit’s ruling in Neo Gen is important because it provides a legitimate framework to balance the
competing interests of political responsibility against the efficiency of
utilizing expertise for regulatory decision making. The actions of
agencies that exercise statewide jurisdiction deserve antitrust immunity without a search for a clear articulation from the state legislature. State agencies should be viewed as legitimate representatives of
the state acting as sovereign because agencies are more similar to
state legislative, executive, and judicial branches than municipalities
or private actors. Because state agencies are not subject to a greater
threat of industry capture than these governmental branches and because agencies promote greater governmental efficiency, they should
not be held to the higher clear articulation standard.
Shane L. Keppner ∗
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